

Coming – Chinese Tide in the Indian Ocean

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Background

China has demonstrated its strategic ambitions for the Indian Ocean and 'Oceans at Large' through activities in the Western Pacific, Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the Baltic Sea. Naturally China is concerned about safety of its Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean, which has some 60,000 ships transiting annually (most heavily trafficked sea routes) carrying two-third of global oil shipments, one-third of bulk cargo and half the container traffic of the world. But it is China's militarisation of Western Pacific, similar intent in IOR, disregard to international laws and norms that cause concern. All media in China is state-controlled, reflects government view, and is optimised for information warfare. China fakes some 488 million social media posts annually.¹ China supports North Korea despite sanctions, tacitly supports Pakistani terrorism, has threatened India on the Doklam standoff, and creates deliberate ambiguity. Wang Wenli, senior official in China's Foreign Ministry officially stated that Bhutan acknowledges Doklam area does not belong to it; a claim Bhutan immediately denied.² China also says it had informed India about constructing a road in Doklam, which is untrue.

Western Pacific

China claims nearly all of the sea, which is believed to sit atop vast oil and gas deposits and through which USD \$5 trillion in annual shipping trade passes. Its sweeping claims overlap with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei, as well as Taiwan. Tensions continue to mount in Western Pacific with China egging North Korea to target US base in Guam. China, under Deng Xiaoping, decided to transfer nuclear technology to the Communists

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and Muslims in Third World based on the strategy that if the West started getting nuked by these countries without Chinese fingerprints, it would be good for China.³ That is how North Korea and Pakistan became nuclear-armed and China continues to support North Korea. But the US's resolve of military action against North Korea possibly doesn't suit China at this time because tensions help China divert attention from further militarisation of South China Sea (SCS). That is why President Xi has personally urged President Trump to exercise restraint in North Korea.⁴ Satellite images show that China continues to expand artificial islands in disputed SCS despite stating it stopped doing so in mid-2015; militarisation activities of turning reefs in the Spratly and Paracel chains into islands, installing military aircraft and missile systems on them continues unabated.⁵ Wang Yi, Chinese Foreign Minister told reporters on sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Manila on 07 Aug 2017 that Beijing completed its SCS reclamation activities two years ago. But Beijing continues to reclaim land farther north, in the Paracel Islands. Since 2015, China has dredged a new harbour, added 10 hectares land on Tree Island in the Paracels, recently completed a new helipad and installed wind turbines and photovoltaic solar arrays there. At this ASEAN Forum meet, the ASEAN bloc released a diluted joint statement on the dispute that failed to mention the arbitration by the UN-backed tribunal ruling last year in favour of the Philippines that discarded China's territorial claims being without legal basis.⁶ But the Philippines, under President Rodrigo Duterte has decided not to use the verdict to pressure China in return for billions of dollars worth of investments and aid, even as Vietnam expressed concerns about further land reclamations in SCS without naming Beijing.

July 2017, witnessed downturn in Vietnam-China relations when China threatened to attack Vietnam if Spain's Repsol continued oil drilling in Block 136-03 in Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone that China claims as disputed.⁷ General Fan Changlong, Deputy Chairman of China's CMC visited Madrid in June 2017 to raise Repsol's drilling activities, then flew to Hanoi to ask Vietnam to halt oil and gas exploration. On 15 Jul 2017, Vietnam directed Repsol to suspend oil drilling in Block 136-03 in the South China Sea. According to BBC, Vietnam informed Repsol executives that "China had threatened to attack Vietnamese bases in the Spratly Islands if the drilling did not stop".⁸ Following the HD

981 crisis in mid-2014, 61 retired senior Vietnamese officials had called on their leadership to take legal action against China, exit China's orbit and abandon the policy of no foreign alliances, no foreign bases, and no use of Vietnam to harm the interests of a third country. Early this year, Vietnam signed its largest gas exploration contract with ExxonMobil to develop the Blue Whale project and Vietnam lifted restrictions on exploration in Block 136-03. In July, China publicly protested when Vietnam extended India's ONGC's lease in Block 128 in the South China Sea. China's focus with reference to Block 136-03 increased when it was recently discovered as a major oilfield, as disclosed by Repsol. The ASEAN bloc cannot go beyond exerting diplomatic pressure, however, China's threat to use force against the Philippines and Vietnam has major ramifications for not only energy security in these two countries but also raises risks for foreign oil companies operating in the SCS. Most significantly, blatantly snubbing the United Nations and the international community at large, China is establishing two Chinese-controlled international maritime courts to provide China's interpretation of maritime law and reinforce its illegal claims.⁹

China in Indian Ocean

In mid-2014, an article in the China Daily stated China plans to build 18 bases in the IOR, outlining a blueprint for the establishment of 18 Chinese "Overseas Strategic Support Bases", also recommending three specific categories: fueling and material supply bases for peacetime (like Djibouti, Aden and Salalah); relatively fixed supply bases for warship berthing, fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft and the naval staff ashore rest (Seychelles); and, fully functional centres for replenishment, rest and large warship weapons maintenance (like Gwadar in Pakistan). China immediately denied such plans and the article was taken off. A second article on the same subject then appeared in the China Daily Mail on 22 Nov 2014 quoting Sri Lankan sources.¹⁰ This article brought out the following: China plans to build 18 "naval bases" in the Indian Ocean including Sri Lanka (Hambantota); China also plans to build naval bases in Pakistan and Myanmar; in Namibia, China plans to build naval supply base at Walvis Bay. The report also quoted Chinese media as saying that China hopes to build 18 to 19 overseas strategic supply bases in Djibouti, Yemen, Oman, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Seychelles,

Madagascar and other parts of Indian Ocean, that these ports will be supply, berth and maintenance bases, and they will be different from the American type of bases, without specifying the difference. In July 2017, China unveiled a massive ship described “magic island maker”; named ‘Tian Kun Hao’, the ship is capable of digging 6,000 cubic metre per hour, equivalent of three standard swimming pools.¹¹ That this would be used in the Indian Ocean is obvious.

In a massive strategic gain for China, Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port was officially transferred to China for 99 years by Sri Lanka in July 2017. Sri Lanka took this step to service the debt on the loan it took from Exim Bank of China to build the port (for the USD 1.5 billion Hambantota Port, 85 per cent of the finances came as loan from China’s Exim Bank, at an interest rate of 6.5 per cent), the repayment amounting to SL Rs 9.1 billion (USD 60 million) annually. China’s Merchants Ports Holdings Company Ltd, which also has the contract for Colombo Port, got charge of the operations under a USD 1.12 billion deal with 70 per cent stakes. First phase of Hambantota development commencing 2011 cost USD 650 million but by December 2016 instead of being able to adhere to the debt repayment schedule, the cumulative losses rose to over USD 3 billion. This is just the beginning of the debt trap that Sri Lanka may find difficult to recover from. Interestingly, it is dawning on Pakistanis that China’s friendship runs one way – in China’s favour.¹² Even Pakistani scholars are talking of how China has debt-tapped Sri Lanka and are fearful of same happening to Pakistan because of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).¹³

With regard to the CPEC and related Chinese projects in Pakistan, Chinese exports to Pakistan surged by 30 per cent in first half of 2016 while Pakistani exports to China dropped by 8 per cent.¹⁴ Pakistani authorities are blaming trade barriers put by Beijing on Pakistani goods and Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that is tilted against Pakistan. Additionally, Pakistan’s current account deficit rose 121 per cent (Jul 2016-Feb 2017). Pakistan is heading for a current account deficit as a percentage of GDP almost double that of India. With the Chinese company expected to invest additional USD 600 million to make the Hambantota port operational, the Sri Lankan Government is confident they would be able to repay the loan; but look at what is happening in Pakistan where Pakistan’s

current account deficit must also be viewed given the billions of dollars of investment promised by China, but Pakistan received only USD 1.3 billion in that period. So, is the CPEC largely being financed by intra-Chinese transfers or 'debt'? Pakistan will have to pay USD 90 billion back to China over 30 years for the CPEC and this doesn't include cumulative debt interest in case of default. Pakistani writers and traders are already raising voices about gains of CPEC going solely to Beijing aside from China's cultural invasion. CPEC is starting with loans but may eventually get converted into equity.

Gwadar gives China immense strategic advantage because of its proximity to the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. China has already positioned naval troops in Djibouti and plans deploying People's Liberation Army (Navy) (PLAN) to 'safeguard' Gwadar. Not only has China engaged in ports development in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, but Chinese economic ties with Africa and the concomitant rise in its naval profile across the IOR have also been conspicuous. The magnitude of investments like in Sri Lanka (Colombo and Hambantota) knowing fully well the economy of the concerned countries, pay back is aimed to be retrieved in strategic terms. Chinese nuclear submarines and warships do not dock at berths of Sri Lanka Port Authority (SLPA) in Colombo mandated to accommodate military vessels but instead at the Colombo South Container Terminal (CSCT), a deep-water facility built, controlled and run by China through an aid project; CSCT is also a 'Chinese enclave' within a Sri Lankan administered harbour, the berthing itself being a violation of protocol. Same thing will happen to Hambantota despite assurances that it would not be used for military purposes. Similarly, in Maldives, China's Integrated Development Project rides on huge concessional loans and aid financing; loans are on such a high rate of interest that Male will default unless given a waiver. So the waiver will come with a strategic price - in exchange to 'control' over maritime projects as done in Sri Lanka.

China recently commissioned its second Aircraft Carrier, is building another six and her nuclear submarines and warships have been crisscrossing the IOR. China plans to deploy two Carrier Battle Groups (CBGs) in the IOR for the time being. That by itself is not worrying given the size and needs of China; however, what is of great concern is the increasingly aggressive attitude of China,

it expanding territorial claims in some 23 countries while sharing borders with only 14, and flouting of international laws and norms.¹⁵ China's recent intrusion in the Doklam Plateau has forced a small and peaceful nation like Bhutan to issue it a demarche, watched by the whole world.

China has been referring to the 1890 Convention between Great Britain and China, relating to Sikkim and Tibet, with the express purpose of creating ambiguity; the Convention having been drawn up in Calcutta by Lord Lansdowne, the Governor-General of India and Sheng-t'ai, the manchu amban from Lhasa, without consulting the Government of Tibet.¹⁶ The Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893 were never recognised by Tibet. Eventually London dealt directly with Tibet, sent the Younghusband expedition to Lhasa in 1904 and opened the doors to organise the tripartite Shimla Convention in 1914, with British India, Tibet and China sitting on equal footing. Now Beijing speaks of 'renegotiating' the 1890 Convention implying that 'equal' treaties signed with the Tibetans, particularly the Shimla Convention and the border agreement (defining the McMahon Line) in 1914, be scrapped – India would then have no more border with Tibet in the Northeast.¹⁷ As significantly, the survey of the 'tri-junction', which is at Batang La following the watershed principle, was done several decades after the 1890 Convention was signed.¹⁸ No way China can justify 'fixing' the tri-junction at 'Gipmochi' by quoting this 'unequal' treaty, when nobody knew where this place 'Gipmochi' was.

India-China Cooperation

Opening China's South Sea Fleet base in the coastal city of Zhanjiang to a group of Indian journalists for the first time in August 2017, Captain Liang Tianjun, Deputy Chief of General Office of Special Security Forces said, "It is my opinion, China and India can make joint contributions to the safety and security of the Indian Ocean."¹⁹ Liang also talked of growing forays of the Chinese warships and submarines into the Indian Ocean, where China for the first time established a naval base at Djibouti, explaining that it will act as a logistics centre and support anti-piracy, UN peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief missions, and provide a 'resting place' for Chinese Navy personnel. He then went on to state that China's military is defensive in nature and not

offensive, China will never intrude other countries and the like, and that China would not be obstructed by other countries. However, no one is under the illusion that while Djibouti, Gwadar and Hambantota are PLAN's well-planned military bases, other would follow soon. Under the ongoing reorganisation, PLA will increase the numbers of other services including the Navy and missile forces. Both Navy and the missile forces were expected to get the lion's share of the annual defence budget which last year amounted to USD152 billion, second only to the US.

China and India working jointly in Indian Ocean needs to be viewed in the backdrop of the China-Pakistan anti-India alliance doing everything possible to limit India's strategic space and destabilise India internally, including Chinese claims on Arunachal and deliberate mischief in our Northeast. This is despite China reaping USD 60 billion annually from the India-China bilateral trade. China needs to realise that continued combative engagement with India will likely harm her own economic interests. India is no pushover and can't be subdued, much that China may want. At the same time, there is enough scope for cooperation provided China deals with India on 'equal' basis.

Conclusion

There is little doubt that China plans to militarise the IOR akin to the SCS. It has its nuclear talons well poised in North Korea and Pakistan in the Indo-Pacific, and it is the Chinese actions that are likely to lead to conflict in the Indian Ocean. Already concerns are high and there is little point in China building amusing perceptions that "India and Australia are not compatible". Western scholars are painting scenarios of future India-China naval war but given the dynamics of the Indian Ocean, such conflict will certainly draw in multi-national forces.²⁰ As it is, the One Belt One Road (OBOR) and Maritime Silk Route (MSR) also aiming to replace the Dollar with the Yuan, will likely generate plenty heat. Hopefully, better sense will prevail and China's territorial ambitions will not take the Indian Ocean towards conflict.

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Nineteenth Party National Congress : Xi Sets Course for Ushering China into New Era

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Background

The Communist Party Convention, which is twice-a-decade event, is of immense political significance in People's Republic of China (PRC). It is during the course of this Convention that the National Congress, symbolic body of Communist Party of China (CPC), ratifies key decisions made behind the closed doors by Party's top brass. These include changes in the apex leadership structure, review of past achievements, amendments to Party Constitution and realigning future direction. The Nineteenth National Congress of CPC was held from 18-25 October 2017 at the 'Great Hall of People' in Beijing. It was attended by 2287 delegates, elected from amongst 89 million Party members.¹ Incidentally, the First Party Congress was held in Shanghai from 23-31 July 1921. Then 13 delegates had participated while the Party membership was barely 50.

As per the ancient Chinese belief, it is the 'mandate of heaven' (*tianming*), the divine source of authority that grants an individual right to rule.² Based on Confucian idea, it ensured dynastic succession, where power and not the lineage mattered. The tradition continued to be observed by various emperors as also politicians till the demise of last Qing Dynasty in 1911, marking the end of feudal monarchy system. Post Chinese Communist revolution in 1949, collective 'Generational Leadership' model was instituted to rule the nation.

The 'First Generation' CPC leaders were revolutionaries - People's Liberation Army (PLA) Veterans, namely Zhou Enlai, Zhu

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De, Chen Yi, led by Mao Zedong. To propel China into the league of industrialised nations, Mao came up with an innovative idea of adopting labour intensive approach. It involved setting up backyard furnaces in the rural areas to produce steel to catch up with the West. Perceived to be 'Great Leap Forward' (1958-60), the initiative turned out to be a disaster, leading to serious famine, killing millions of people. To retain his popularity and defang the opponents, Mao launched 'Cultural Revolution' (1966-76), which again proved to be a fiasco, causing serious economic turbulence. Over a period of time, Mao emerged as an autocrat. His ideology; 'Mao's Thoughts', a political theory which propagated 'collectivism in a classless society', encapsulated in famous 'red book' was enshrined in the Party Constitution.³

Deng Xiaoping, a PLA Veteran assumed the 'Second Generation' leadership post Mao's death. There was a brief spell of power struggle as Mao had left no successor. Deng did away with most Mao's practices in 1978. His guiding ideology was 'socialism with Chinese characteristics', focussed on economic growth by easing government hold on the means of production.⁴ It entailed reforming agriculture by de-collectivising of farms. To unleash entrepreneurial spirit, Deng pushed for restructuring the industrial sector by allowing privatisation of small scale enterprises and, thereafter, opening of Chinese economy to foreign investors. It was a clear departure from 'class struggle' enunciated by Mao. During Deng's regime, while the general standard of living improved, the inequality gap widened too.

Jiang Zemin emerged as the core of the 'Third Generation' leadership after Deng's demise in 1997 and pursued collective style of leadership. He officially adopted market economy and reformed 'state owned enterprises'. His 'three represents' ideology, (*san ge daibiao*) propagated that the CPC should be the representative of advance social forces (to drive economic growth), culture and core interests of the Chinese society.⁵ Jiang believed in *status quo* and was averse to the idea of bold reforms. Jiang's successor Hu Jintao, as the head of 'Fourth Generation' leadership laid emphasis on reforming social security. He introduced the concept of 'scientific development and harmonious society'.⁶

For the 'Fifth Generation' Leadership, Xi was selected as a consensus candidate. On assuming power in 2012, he moved

fast. Xi systematically consolidated position by strengthening hold on Party and PLA (twin pillars of power in China's political structure) by virtue of triple titles; Secretary General of CCP, Chairman Central Military Commission (CMC) the highest military body and President of People's Republic.

Given the menace of corruption that had got deeply engrained in the Party culture, Xi unleashed an unbridled campaign to clean up the system. This involved targeting both the low ranking bureaucrats, referred to as flies, to the highest level officials referred to as tigers. As a result, 278,000 persons have been implicated in the anti-corruption drive including 440 high ranking officials holding ministerial or higher positions in the government, both civil and military.⁷ Some of the stalwarts against whom disciplinary action had been initiated are; Zhou Yongkang – former member of the apex political body, Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) and Bo Xilai – member Politburo and Party Secretary Chongqing. Besides, two senior most PLA Generals – Guo Boxing and Xu Caihu, Vice Chairmen of Central Military Commission (CMC) too faced corruption charges. The anti-corruption campaign has also proved handy in purging the political rivals.

According high priority to defence modernisation, President Xi initiated path breaking military reforms. The rationale was twofold; firstly to prepare defence forces for their future role and secondly, maintain Party's firm control over the PLA. On 30 October 2014 at Gutian, a small town in Fujian Province, President Xi reiterated; "PLA remains Party's Army and must maintain absolute loyalty to political masters"; exactly repeating what Mao had said eight and half decades back.⁸ The reforms process started in 2013 with the establishment of National Security Commission, with Xi as the Chairman. As a sequel to the reorganisation of CMC, President as the 'Commander in Chief' exercises direct operational control over the military through the 'Joint Operational Center'. By ordering series of reshuffles in the top military ranks, Xi ensured that his loyalists occupied the key positions.

Nineteenth Party National Congress – Xi Sets Course

The Party Congresses are primarily about leadership, political vision and ideology. As brought out above, President Xi had worked assiduously during his first five year term to gain control of all levers of power. Nineteenth Party Congress was only a culmination

of the power play wherein Xi further entrenched his position. By cementing CPC's absolute authority and enshrining of "Xi Jinping Thought for New Era Socialism with Chinese Special Characteristics" in the Party constitution as guiding principle makes Xi China's most powerful leader, in the league of Mao.⁹ His eponymous political ideology proposes an alternate to liberal democracy around which CPC coalesces. Here on, any criticism of Xi policies will be deemed as an attack on the Communist Party itself.

In a clear departure from the Party's well established tradition being followed over last two decades, PSC did not choose 'Sixth Generation' leader as successor to be groomed to take over from Xi when he completes his second five year term. Hence, it is apparent that Xi is set to continue well beyond 2022, by seeking third term, which will mean setting a new precedence. Interestingly, two probable contenders; Hu Chunhua (Party Chief of Guangdong Province) and Chen Miner (Party Head of Chongqing City), Xi's protégé did not make to the PSC; a mandatory requirement for the incumbent Party Secretary General.

It is evident that for the long term survival of 'one party system', it is an inescapable imperative that China sustains its fast pace of growth. This demands deft management of socio-economic transformation while excluding political reforms to avoid internal instability. Xi's focus is on revival of CPC to improve the state governance. To achieve this, new generation of competent people are being inducted into the Party. Enforcing 'rule of law' is high on Xi's agenda which implies strengthening the institutional mechanism, while idea of independent judiciary remains elusive. To navigate through the above paradoxes is a tall order for the Communist leadership.

Xi has unfolded 'China Dream' (*fluxing*) which envisions powerful and prosperous China. It aims at national rejuvenation, besides encouraging people to seek fulfilment beyond material wealth. While presenting his report during the opening session of the recent Party Congress, Xi rolled out his grand design. It referred to China, entering a 'New Era' marked by social contradictions. He has propounded policy of 'striving for achievements' (*fanfa youwei*), while advocating a greater Chinese leadership role in the world affairs. This marks an obvious departure from Deng's strategy

being followed implicitly for last over two decades, which professed China to 'maintain low profile and bid for time' till it completes peaceful rise.

To translate 'China Dream' into reality, Xi has outlined 'twin centenary objectives'; to become 'fully modern' economy and society by 2035 and acquire 'great power' status by 2050, timed with the centenary foundation of the PRC.¹⁰ Xi's vision envisages China to be a key player in shaping new world order with Chinese characteristics and regain its past grandeur; rightful place in the global polity.

Implications

Today, the global order is in flux. Three key players – the US, Russia and China are in the fray to shape it in consonance with their respective national interests. Given President Trump's 'Doctrine of Uncertainty', the USA is in a state of ambiguity regarding its global role. Russia, under President Putin is still in delusion of Cold War symmetry. It seems to be heading for a major political crisis.¹¹ On the other hand, President Xi has articulated a clear vision and long term strategy on China's future role.

During marathon recital at the Party Congress opening session on 18 October, Xi stated that 'no country alone can address the many challenges facing mankind and no country can retreat into isolation'. His envisioned architecture of great power interface is based on parity in US-China relations. Xi also reiterated China's rejection of 'Cold War political mentality'. Now as a paramount leader, he is expected to pursue proactive diplomacy in restructuring the international systems, whose underlying rules will be increasingly framed by China.

With the US yielding strategic space in pursuit of Trump's 'America First' policy coupled with eroding credibility of Western leadership, Xi has projected himself as the flag bearer of globalisation and trade liberalisation. At Davos World Economic Forum 2017, Xi strongly batted for globalised economy. Over the last five years, new institutions like the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) have been established. Concurrently, major projects like the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) and Maritime Silk Route (MSR) have been launched. These initiatives have been termed as the "community of common destiny"; extension of neighbour

centric 'periphery policy' enunciated in 2013. Such measures will facilitate China to leverage its Comprehensive National Power (CNP) in pursuit of revised strategic objectives.

In his recent Congress speech, Xi had stated that China would strive to resolve disputes through dialogue but will not compromise on national sovereignty. He has begun his second term by exhorting over two million strong China's military to be combat ready by focussing on how to win wars. China's official stated position on the integration of claimed territories does not discount use of force as an option. For India, China under a powerful autocratic leader does not augur well, given the past record. 1962 War, standoffs in 1967 and 1987 occurred during Mao and Deng rule. Recent face-offs at Depsang, Demchok and Doklam have all taken place during Xi's time. India will have to be prepared to counter growing Chinese assertiveness.¹²

Today, Xi rides the Dragon which is externally formidable but internally fragile. He is well aware of the consequences should his policies go awry. As political reforms are not on Xi's agenda, it is economic growth that is the key to translate Xi's China dream into reality. There is skepticism about the sustainability of China's current economic model, given signs of slowing down. Therefore, some tough reforms are inevitable in the future which are likely to lead to social turbulence.

While beginning his first five years term, Xi had stated that to forge iron, you ought to be strong. Hence, he went about systematically to grab power and pushed through the process of consolidation ruthlessly, making himself unassailable. Xi envisions China to be a beacon of stability and prosperity following an alternate path, defying the Western model. Ironically, Chinese leadership's oft-touted claim of peaceful rise is not in sync with actions. As per eminent scholar Graham Allison, the founder of Harvard Belfer Center, greatest challenge facing the globe is China's rise. In his latest book *"Destined for War – Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap"*, he has stated that only through moderation and imaginative diplomacy can the conflict situation be avoided.¹³

Conclusion

Xi joins the league of Mao and Deng while he does not belong to the tribe. Being smart and compared to the likes of Nelson Mandela

by no lesser person than late statesman Lee Kuan Yew, he is not likely to commit the same mistakes as his predecessors. Xi is in quest of legacy as a great reformer. To this end, he has unfolded a grand design and set the course to usher China into a 'new era' and acquire superpower status in coming three decades. It's a tough call fraught with high risks; but a price Xi is willing to pay to secure his ordained place in the history.

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¹¹ Oliver Carrol, (19 Nov 2017), *Russia's Uncertain Future*, Independent Available at <https://www.google.co.in>, assessed 20 Nov 2017, 5pm.

¹² Chankya, Hindustan Times, 29 Oct 2017.

¹³ Graham Allison, (2017), *Destined For War – Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap?*, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, New York, p vii.